Report: 5.8 Million Knocks: A Three-Year Honeypot Record of SSH and Telnet Attacks
Two odd strings, not classic weak passwords, lead the credential list, and together they account for 14.8% of all attacks. Each attack presents exactly one username and password pair, so every count below is a number of attacks: the ten pairs cover 870,690 attacks, exactly 19.1% of the 4,562,740 total.
Top-10 credential pairs by number of attacks they appear in
| Rank | Username | Password | Attacks | Share of all attacks | Share of top 10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 345gs5662d34 |
345gs5662d34 |
350,630 | 7.68% | 40.3% |
| 2 | root |
3245gs5662d34 |
324,965 | 7.12% | 37.3% |
| 3 | root |
admin |
54,169 | 1.19% | 6.2% |
| 4 | root |
(blank) | 52,271 | 1.15% | 6.0% |
| 5 | admin |
admin |
24,699 | 0.54% | 2.8% |
| 6 | admin |
3245gs5662d34 |
17,600 | 0.39% | 2.0% |
| 7 | root |
root |
15,428 | 0.34% | 1.8% |
| 8 | root |
admin123 |
12,782 | 0.28% | 1.5% |
| 9 | root |
qwerty |
9,917 | 0.22% | 1.1% |
| 10 | root |
123456 |
8,229 | 0.18% | 0.9% |
Four observations follow from the table:
-
One string family dominates. Ranks 1, 2 and 6 all use
345gs5662d34or the near-identical3245gs5662d34, totaling 693,195 attacks: 15.2% of all attacks and 79.6% of the top ten. These credentials are part of the Outlaw Shellbot SSH botnet’s routine. This was confirmed after observing a strong correlation between the IP addresses that used a brute-force approach with the345gs5662d34credential family and the IP addresses with indicators of compromise associated with the Shellbot attacks (e.g., presence of themdrfckrstring). It is not entirely established why these particular credentials entered brute-force dictionaries. A few theories exist:-
Polycom CX600 default password. This is the most repeated explanation, and it traces back to one sentence in a 2023 cybersecurity study developed by researchers from Aalborg University and the Technical University of Denmark. The authors say that, upon researching the password, they found it is possibly the default credential for a Polycom CX600 IP telephone for both the username and password. They give no citation or vendor documentation. Later blog posts and write-ups repeat it, some more firmly than the original.
-
“Is this host already ours?” check. One cyber-research team speculates that the unique strings were either chosen or synthetically constructed to implement a check for whether the server is already compromised. That would require the attack to change the SSH username and password after a successful penetration to
3245gs5662d34. -
Poorly coded bots. One analysis notes that bots sometimes enter passwords into the wrong fields, which could explain why the same string, perhaps intended as a password, shows up as both username and password. This clumsy behavior may explain the slight variation—an extra character—observed in the field (
3245gs5662d34vs345gs5662d34). That is a comment on the quirk, not a confirmed cause.
In short:
345gs5662d34is a real default credential from Polycom hardware that entered the common credential pools years ago and remains heavily used by the Outlaw cryptojacking botnet and generic SSH sprayers. That combination produces the volume honeypot operators continue to observe to this day. -
-
Root is the main target. The
rootusername appears in seven of the top-ten pairs, in at least 477,761 attacks (10.5% of all attacks).adminappears in two pairs, in at least 42,299 attacks (0.9%). Because these totals add up only the top-ten pairs that use each name, they are lower bounds. The same applies to the password3245gs5662d34(at least 342,565 attacks, 7.5%),admin(at least 78,868, 1.7%) and the blank password (at least 52,271, 1.1%). -
Classic weak pairs are a small share. Setting the string family aside, the other seven pairs cover 177,495 attacks, 3.9% of all attacks. They are the blank password,
admin,root,admin123,qwerty, and123456. -
The tail is wide. Exactly 3,692,050 attacks (80.9%) used pairs outside the top ten. That suggests large and varied dictionaries, something confirmed by the analysis of the data: in all, 427,345 distinct credential pairs were involved.
One caution applies. The honeypot’s acceptance policy decides which pairs succeed, so this list shows what attackers try, not what real systems would accept.
The string family also makes a useful detection signal: a login attempt with either string on a production system is a strong sign of automated tooling.
Report: 5.8 Million Knocks: A Three-Year Honeypot Record of SSH and Telnet Attacks
Leave a Reply