Report: 5.8 Million Knocks: A Three-Year Honeypot Record of SSH and Telnet Attacks
SSH carried 84.8% of all connections (4,925,016), a ratio of 5.6 to 1 over Telnet (885,140, or 15.2%). Table 7 below breaks each protocol’s traffic down into scans and attacks.
Telnet’s share is still large for a protocol with no encryption, which shows that attackers keep probing for it. The practical reading is that both protocols need attention, and that Telnet, the weaker of the two in terms of security, should not be exposed at all.
| Protocol | Activity | Unsolicited connections count | Share |
|---|---|---|---|
| SSH | Scans | 510,149 | 40.9% |
| SSH | Attacks | 4,414,867 | 96.8% |
| Telnet | Scans | 737,267 | 59.1% |
| Telnet | Attacks | 147,873 | 3.2% |
The following insights can be gleaned from the data:
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SSH: overwhelmingly attack-driven. Attacks outnumber scans nearly 9 to 1 (4.41M vs 510K), so about 90% of SSH traffic went beyond probing. This fits what honeypots typically see: credential-stuffing and brute-force botnets hammering port 22 around the clock. A scan is cheap and often a one-off, while an attack involves many repeated login attempts per source, so the attack count is inflated by volume per attacker.
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Telnet: mostly reconnaissance. The ratio flips: scans outnumber attacks about 5 to 1 (737K vs 148K). Telnet scanning is dominated by IoT botnets (Mirai and its descendants) that sweep the internet for open port 23 and only escalate to credential attempts against hosts that respond in a way they like. A honeypot may not look like the device types they target, so many probes stop at the scan stage. Telnet is also a legacy protocol, so there are fewer real targets and the sweeps are more speculative.
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Cross-protocol comparison. SSH traffic is about 85% of all activity recorded, while traffic received over Telnet is 15% of the total. SSH attacks exceed Telnet attacks by roughly 30x, but Telnet scans are about 45% higher than SSH scans. In other words, Telnet gets plenty of attention, but it converts to attacks far less often. Attackers appear to prioritize SSH once they find a listener, since it usually fronts higher-value servers (cloud virtual machines, Linux boxes) that are useful for cryptomining, proxying, and DDoS attacks.
Report: 5.8 Million Knocks: A Three-Year Honeypot Record of SSH and Telnet Attacks
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